top of page

A New Theory of Justice & Other Essays

A New Theory of Justice and Other Essays consists of five essays on different philosophical topics, 

​

1. ‘A New Theory of Justice’, the longest in the collection, argues that we cannot say what justice is, only what the word means (which probably amounts to how it is used). The question of what justice is, is fully answered (adequately or not) by ethical theories like utilitarianism, natural law and deontology, and these leave no remainder such as could be fruitfully addressed by a supplementary ‘theory of justice’; what is ‘just’ in any particular situation is simply what is the morally right outcome. As for how ‘justice’ is used, at the extremes there are two different ways, which I call ‘harmonic’ and ‘emancipatory’. The former is prior.


2. ‘A New Approach to the Philosophy of Religion’ begins with the claim: ‘If one imagines philosophy as a city, then the philosophy of religion is like a museum on the outskirts that hardly anyone visits except on school trips.’ It argues that rather than asking whether God exists – God defined as a being with all the properties that belong to the classical philosophical notion of aseity – the philosophy of religion should ask about the necessary (as opposed to the sufficient) qualities of God. The essay identifies just two: incorporeality and mindedness. This would bring the philosophy of religion into communication with the philosophy of mind, and also metaphysics and epistemology. It might not be welcome.

3. ‘On the Possible Varieties of Consciousness’ addresses the question of how we go about ascribing mindedness to things we discover in the world. It argues that we employ two classes of data and a hermeneutic. The data classes are: (1) the size and complexity of the individual’s nervous system and (2) the individual’s behaviour. These are processed by a hermeneutic that gives overwhelming precedence to (2), and which asserts, roughly, that species generally seek to survive, and to preserve and transmit their genetic material. The essay then argues that, owing to the problem of missing senses, one of the key components of this calculation – (2) – is radically unreliable. Which only leaves (1) as a means of determining the degree of mindedness of an individual. But (1) fails in the same way that the classical ‘argument for other minds from analogy’ (discussed in the essay) fails.

 

4. ‘Towards Some Kind of ‘Solution’ to the Problem of Evil’ tries to address the apparent contradiction between God’s alleged goodness and omnipotence, and the reality of evil in the world - without belittling the problem. It argues that the issue’s political-social formulation has always been confused with its metaphysical expression. Once the two are disentangled, the problem may not appear so intractable. 

 

5. ‘Free Will and Libet’s Experiment’ argues that human free-will is a reality, at least within the limits allowed by common sense. It proposes a thought-experiment by way of convincing the reader.

bottom of page